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Protecting intellectual endeavors and encouraging technological progress is 
critical to maintain the United States’ technological edge.1 The importance of 
the nation’s technological edge is recognized in the United States Constitution, 
which provides Congress with the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”2 (the “IP Clause”). 
Patent law serves these interests—it protects new innovations to encourage 
more innovations, maximizing social welfare.3 However, tension between pa-
tent law’s underlying utilitarian policy and the goal to maximize social welfare 
undermines “the ingenuity of American inventors and entrepreneurs.”4 
More tension arises when sovereign immunity is involved. In the United 
States, local and federal governments, foreign nations, and Indian tribes enjoy 
sovereign immunity.5 The sovereign immunity doctrine provides a sovereign 
with immunity from suit in its own courts and those of another.6 The principles 
underlying sovereign immunity are those of comity, protection of a sovereign’s 
treasuries, and preventing disruption to the organized administration of a sover-
eign’s government.7 Sovereign immunity is rationalized as a benefit to society.8 
Yet, plaintiffs are often forced to endure losses caused by otherwise actionable 
wrongs.9 
Recently, an agreement between Allergan, Inc. (“Allergan”), a pharmaceu-
tical company, and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, a Native American Tribe, to 
“buy” the Tribe’s sovereign immunity aroused controversy;10 is such agreement 
                                                        
1  General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 2015), https 
://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents [https://per 
ma.cc/NL5F-GZYN]. 
2  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3  Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1329, 1366 (2012). 
4  About Us, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (June 5, 2018, 10:48 AM), https://www.uspto.go 
v/about-us [https://perma.cc/7YUC-U3CM]. See generally Dorian Ojemen, Comment, The 
Ethics of Inter Partes Review Before the USPTO, 47 ST. MARY’S L.J. 645, 648 (2016). 
5  Thomas P. McLish, Note, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible Limits, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 173, 179 (1988). 
6  Id. at 174. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  Matt Levine, Sovereign Immunity and Public Hangings, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2017, 
6:26 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-11/sovereign-immunity-and-p 
ublic-hangings [https://perma.cc/WY3L-K7D7]; Carlos Quijada, Patents and Tribal Sover-
eign Immunity, BIOLAWTODAY.ORG (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.law.utah.edu/patents-and-t 
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clever or deceptive? The deal was triggered after Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(“Mylan”), a generic drug maker, along with two other pharmaceuticals manu-
facturers, challenged Allergan’s Restasis (a dry eye medication) patents’ validi-
ty before the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”).11 The PTAB had 
instituted Inter Partes Review (“IPR”) proceedings for six of Allergan’s pa-
tents.12 While IPR was pending, Allergan assigned its rights of its Restasis pa-
tents to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.13 The Tribe in turn granted Allergan an 
exclusive field-of-use license to the patents.14 
The agreement between Allergan and the Tribe specifically bargained for 
the Tribe’s assertion of sovereign immunity against Mylan’s IPR petition be-
fore the PTAB—not the challenge before the federal court.15 If Allergan could 
avoid the IPR, Allergan would prevent the PTAB from cancelling its patents.16 
As such, the Tribe moved to dismiss Mylan’s petition for IPR, asserting its 
sovereign immunity, and Allergan moved to withdraw from the IPR proceed-
ings.17 
                                                                                                                                
ribal-sovereign-immunity/ [https://perma.cc/THF7-2WGF]; Shock Exchange, Allergan: 
Judge Bryson Uses ‘Patents’ and ‘Sham’ in a Sentence, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 9, 2017, 4:55 
AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4112345-allergan-judge-bryson-uses-patents-sham-se 
ntence [https://perma.cc/Y8QJ-HW64]; Meg Tirrell, Senators Question Allergan CEO on 
Tribe Patent Deal, CNBC (Nov. 7, 2017, 6:55 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/07/senat 
ors-question-allergan-ceo-on-tribe-patent-deal.html [https://perma.cc/UU8J-H2KN]; Jan 
Wolfe, Tech Firms Tell Patent Court to Ignore Allergan Deal with Tribe, REUTERS (Dec. 1, 
2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-patent/tech-firms-tell-patent-co 
urt-to-ignore-allergan-deal-with-tribe-idUSKBN1DV63M [https://perma.cc/D2H2-X7AP]. 
11  Quijada, supra note 10; Wolfe, supra note 10. This challenge was filed parallel to patent 
litigation in federal court. Katie Thomas, Patents for Restasis Are Invalidated, Opening 
Door to Generics, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/health/ 
allergan-restasis-patent-.html [https://perma.cc/5MYG-UWN6]. Allergan filed suit against 
Mylan in the Eastern District of Texas alleging infringement of the Restasis patents. Id. The 
Court invalidated four key patents. Id. 
12  Wanli Tang & J. Patrick Elsevier, United States: PTAB Agrees to Review Patent Claims 
Covering Dry Eye Ailments, MONDAQ (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x 
/555186/Patent/PTAB+Agrees+to+Review+Patent+Claims+Covering+Dry+Eye+Ailments 
[https://perma.cc/3RHM-25RS]. 
13  Tirrell, supra note 10. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at 
*2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017), aff’d mem. 742 Fed. App’x 511 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “Allergan is 
attempting to misuse Native American sovereignty to shield invalid patents from cancella-
tion.” Id. at *1. 
17  Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1. The Eastern District Court of Texas joined the Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe as a co-plaintiff in the civil action. Id. at *5. The Court invalidated the 
Restasis patents based on obviousness. Jan Wolfe & Michael Erman, U.S. Judge in Texas 
Invalidates Allergan Patents on Restasis, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2017, 10:28 AM), https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-allergan-patents/u-s-judge-in-texas-invalidates-allergan-patents-on-res 
tasis-idUSKBN1CL2KE [https://perma.cc/5AEU-H2TC]. Federal Judge William Bryson 
expressed his concerns regarding the agreement between Allergan and the tribe, noting that 
“sovereign immunity should not be treated as a monetizable commodity that can be pur-
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The PTAB did not extend the protections of tribal immunity to IPR and 
denied Allergan’s motion to withdraw from the proceedings.18 Next, an appeal 
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit followed.19 The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Board’s decision dismissing the Tribe’s assertion of immunity.20 
The Federal Circuit reasoned that IPRs were not “the type of proceedings from 
which the Framers would have thought the States possessed immunity” because 
of the proceedings’ functional and procedural differences from civil litigation.21 
The Federal Circuit did not extend tribal immunity to IPR because sovereign 
immunity is implicated in disputes between private parties, but not in suits 
brought by the federal government.22 This decision precisely exhibits the need 
to define the contours of tribal immunity. 
Allergan is not the only company with tricks up its sleeve. Prowire LLC 
(“Prowire”), a Texas company, has also invested in “immunity” for its patent.23 
Prowire assigned its patent to MEC Resources LLC (“MEC”), which is wholly 
owned by a Native American tribe.24 Like Allergan, MEC is asserting its tribal 
immunity to avoid an IPR challenge that could invalidate the patent.25 Compa-
nies are protecting their business interests by “buying” immunity. In fact, the 
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe confirmed that it is holding forty patents from an-
other technology company.26 
In light of the controversial legal immunity purchase, Senator Claire 
McCaskill introduced a bill to remedy the gap between law and remedy agree-
ments like that of Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe create.27 Specif-
ically, the bill will prohibit an Indian tribe from asserting sovereign immunity 
                                                                                                                                
chased by private entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal responsibilities.” Allergan, 
2017 WL 4619790, at *3; Jan Wolfe, Allergan Ruling Casts Doubt on Tribal Patent Strate-
gy, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-patents-a 
nalysis/allergan-ruling-casts-doubt-on-tribal-patent-strategy-idUSKBN1CM369 [https://per 
ma.cc/C8LL-RF46]. 
18  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018); 
Steven A. Caloiaro & Caleb L. Green, Sovereign Shield Does Not Extend to Inter Partes Re-
views, CLIENT ALERT (July 26, 2018), https://www.dickinson-wright.com/-/media/files/news/ 
2018/07/sovereign-shield-does-not-extend-to-inter-partes-r.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6HY-7XZ 
T]. 
19  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1325. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. at 1326; Caloiaro & Green, supra note 18. 
22  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1327. 
23  Joe Mullin, Apple is Being Sued for Patent Infringement by a Native American Tribe, 
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 27, 2017, 5:11 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/09/appl 
e-is-being-sued-for-patent-infringement-by-a-native-american-tribe/ [https://perma.cc/8YW 
M-GS4Y]. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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as a defense in an IPR proceeding.28 The bill would completely “derail [the] 
landmark and lucrative deal” between Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk 
Tribe, and other similar transactions.29 
In this Note, I argue that the recent exploitation of tribal immunity demon-
strates the need to abrogate tribal immunity in particular instances. Specifically, 
suits where the cause of action arises out of commercial activities and off-
reservation activities affecting the United States directly. “Buying” immunity 
for protection against patent challenges is now an option for businesses wanting 
to protect their patents. This Note addresses the issues that arise from the blan-
ket assertion of tribal immunity to protect patents before the PTAB and other 
proceedings and the effect the assertion of immunity has on “Authors and In-
ventors.”30 Moreover, a recent Supreme Court case, Lewis v. Clarke,31 offers 
insight into the change in the Supreme Court’s perspective and the likely limi-
tations to the scope of tribal immunity ahead. 
Part I briefly summarizes patent law in the United States and the IPR pro-
cedure before the PTAB. Part II reviews the origins of sovereign immunity, 
briefly summarizing state, federal, and foreign immunity, which allows for the 
examination of the development of tribal immunity. Tribal immunity jurispru-
dence demonstrates that tribal immunity is broader, in comparison to the sover-
eign immunity of states, the federal government, and foreign nations. Part III 
also delves into the abrogation of tribal immunity and Part IV analyzes the 
Lewis v. Clarke decision. Part V argues for the limitation of the scope of tribal 
immunity. Specifically, tribal immunity should be subject to the same limita-
tions applicable to the sovereign immunity of states, the federal government, 
and foreign nations. The Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis v. Clarke provides 
sound reasoning supporting such limitations. In light of the transaction between 
Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, the abrogation of tribal immunity 
in IPR is just the tip of the iceberg. This Note concludes that the scope of tribal 
immunity necessitates review and advocates for appropriate action. 
I. UNITED STATES PATENT LAW 
The basis for U.S. Patent law is derived from the IP Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution.32 Patent law is codified in Title 35 of the United States Code, 
                                                        
28  Id. 
29  Sen. McCaskill Unveils Unprecedented Bill to Abrogate Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 
INDIANZ (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/10/05/sen-mccaskill-unveils-u 
nprecedented-bill.asp [https://perma.cc/762C-8H99]. The PTAB denied the Saint Regis Mo-
hawk tribe’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity in Feb. 2018. Jan Wolfe, U.S. 
Patent Court Deals Setback to Allergan’s Restasis Strategy, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2018, 8:04 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-allergan-patent-tribe/u-s-patent-court-deals-setback 
-to-allergans-restasis-strategy-idUSKCN1GA239 [https://perma.cc/8MAT-UGYJ]. 
30  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Fromer, supra note 3. 
31  Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1288 (2017). 
32  Fromer, supra note 3, at 1366. 
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which established the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).33 
The USPTO fulfills the IP Clause of the Constitution and is the federal agency 
granting U.S. patents for the protection of inventions.34 
Congress has the enumerated power to enact laws relating to patents. That 
power, however, is limited by the policy considerations underlying patent 
law—the interplay between the goal of enhancing innovation and patent protec-
tion.35 
The U.S. economy’s strength and vitality depends on patent law—the “ef-
fective mechanisms that protect new ideas and investments in innovation and 
creativity.”36 Patent law is the branch of intellectual property law relating to 
new inventions, designed to encourage and promote technological growth 
through the protection of inventions.37 Patent law is based on utilitarian-
ism⎯by incentivizing authors with exclusive rights they are motivated “to cre-
ate culturally valuable works.”38 Without such incentives, authors would not 
otherwise waste their time and money because their work could be easily cop-
ied, eliminating their profits.39 
A patent for an invention is the exclusive property right granted to an in-
ventor by the USPTO.40 The grant provides the patentee “the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention” for a 
twenty-year term from the application filing date.41 Patent law motivates au-
thors to disclose their new technologies and benefit the public.42 An applicant 
may challenge the USPTO’s patent determinations through the PTAB or 
through the federal court system.43 
                                                        
33  35 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 1. 
34  35 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 1. 
35  Fromer, supra note 3, at 1366. 
36  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 4; see also Fromer, supra note 3, at 1366. 
37  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 4. 
38  Fromer, supra note 3, at 1366. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
42  Fromer, supra note 3, at 1366; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 4. 
43  35 U.S.C. §§ 134, 141 (2012). The availability of different tribunals presents litigants 
with opportunities and challenges, which are beyond the scope of this Note. There are sever-
al key differences in challenging patents in the PTAB compared to federal courts—there are 
timing and fee differences, different legal standards, and complex issues are probably better 
off in the PTAB. Id. at §§ 134, 141; see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 
2146 (2016); Novartis AG v. Noven Pharm., Inc., 853 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2017); 
Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL 
4015009, at *11 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (order dismissing petitions for Inter Partes Review 
based on Sovereign Immunity); Dorothy P. Whelan & John A. Dragseth, Validity Challeng-
es: District Court vs. Patent Office, LAW360 (Dec. 18, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.fr.com/ 
files/Uploads/Documents/Validity-Challenges_District-Court-Vs-Patent-Office.pdf [https://p 
erma.cc/ZY23-LQLK]. The decision to pursue either forum is purely strategic. Whelan & 
Dragseth, supra. Parties are motivated to initiate both PTAB and district court proceedings, 
because “parties seek to get the upper hand toward locking in an estoppel.” Id. Further, 
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In furtherance of the policy underlying patent law, a patentee has “remedy 
by civil action for infringement of his patent.”44 Patent infringement is engag-
ing in prohibited activities implicating a patent owner’s exclusive rights.45 In-
fringement occurs whether or not a person has a license.46 The USPTO, howev-
er, does not have “jurisdiction over questions of [patent] infringement” and 
their enforcement.47 
A. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’s (“AIA”) created the PTAB which 
was a notable change to former patent procedures. The AIA was a compromise 
between the Senate and the House to effect needed patent reform.48 The AIA 
was signed into law in 201149 and aims to address the Patent Office’s over-
whelming number of cases, the office’s failure to provide timely patents, the 
inconsistency in quality of issued patents, and the time and costs of patent liti-
gation.50 
The PTAB is an administrative agency of the USPTO created by statute.51 
The PTAB includes the Appeals Division and the Trial Division, and it is 
charged with deciding patentability issues—adverse examiner decisions, post-
issuance challenges to patents, and interferences.52 PTAB proceedings are gen-
erally referred to as “post-grant” proceedings because they happen in the 
USPTO, after the USPTO has granted a patent.53 The Trial Division of the 
                                                                                                                                
PTAB decisions do not bind federal court decisions. Id. PTAB and district court may reach 
different conclusions when addressing the same arguments and the same evidence because of 
the difference in evidentiary burdens. Id. Hence, prior PTAB determinations are not binding 
on federal courts. Id. 
44  35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 1. 
45  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 1. 
46  Infringement can occur when a licensee is engaging in activities beyond the scope of the 
licensing agreement. Id. Patent applications are submitted to the USPTO and the USPTO 
examines the applications “to determine if the applicants are entitled to patents under the law 
and patents are granted when applicants are so entitled.” Id. The scope of the patented inno-
vation and the extent of its protection is defined in the claims of the granted patent. Id. 
47  Id. 
48  Ojemen, supra note 4, at 653. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 648. The biggest complaint of the former patent system was timeliness. Id. at 649. 
Before the AIA the average wait time for any determination from the PTAB was approxi-
mately 2.9 years. Id. There was also a backlog of pending patent applications. Id. Such de-
lays significantly impacted the development of additional products, the gain of venture capi-
tal, and the commercialization of new technology, as patents were just sitting on the shelf 
waiting. Id. 
51  35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
52  35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2012); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
(May 24, 2016, 10:57 AM), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-pa 
tent-decisions/appeals/patent-trial-and-appeal-board [https://perma.cc/QKP3-XES8]. 
53  35 U.S.C. § 141 (2012). 
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PTAB addresses contested cases, including IPR.54 Final PTAB decisions can be 
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.55 
B. Inter Partes Review 
Inter Partes Review is “a kind of mini-litigation system . . . before the . . . 
[PTAB], rather than in district courts.”56 IPR is a proceeding providing a means 
of challenging the validity of a patent that may have been mistakenly issued by 
the USPTO.57 Through IPR proceedings the agency is able to take a second 
look at its own decision to issue a patent, correcting errors made by the gov-
ernment, while district court proceedings aim at correcting defective private ac-
tion.58 IPR is a valuable tool because it is quicker and cheaper than district 
courts.59 
An IPR proceeding reviews the patentability of at least one claim in a pa-
tent.60 IPR, however, is limited to claims raised under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103, 
and claims based on prior art consisting of patent or printed publications.61 IPR 
aims to address such issues early on and avoid costly and time-consuming liti-
gation.62 
IPR proceedings begin with a “challenger,” someone other than the patent 
owner, filing a petition requesting an IPR before the PTAB.63 To institute an 
IPR, the challenger must show there is “a reasonable likelihood that the peti-
tioner would prevail [on] at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition,” 
by a preponderance of the evidence.64 After the petition has been filed, the pa-
                                                        
54  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 52. The trial division also includes Post Grant 
Review, Transitional Program for Covered Business Methods Patents, and Derivation Pro-
ceedings. Id.; Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. (May 9, 2017, 10:17 AM), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-proc 
ess/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/transitional-program-covered-business [https://perma.cc 
/5LZK-W84V]. 
55  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 1. 
56  Mullin, supra note 23. 
57  Inter Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (May 9, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://ww 
w.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review 
[http://perma.cc/26UQ-RZ84]. 
58  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 
2018). 
59  Ojemen, supra note 4, at 652. 
60  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 57. 
61  35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 57. 
62  Ojemen, supra note 4, at 665; Anne S. Layne-Farrar, The Cost of Doubling Up: An Eco-
nomic Assessment of Duplication in PTAB Proceedings and Patent Infringement Litigation, 
LANDSLIDE (May & June 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_l 
aw/publications/landslide/2017-18/may-june/cost-doubling-up/ [https://perma.cc/SSE5-22Q 
L]. 
63  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 57. 
64  35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012) (declaring IPR institution deadlines); Ojemen, supra note 4, at 
659. 
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tent owner may file a preliminary response within three months, explaining 
why the challenger’s IPR petition should be denied.65 The patent owner’s deci-
sion to file a preliminary response is only strategic and does not increase the 
likelihood that the PTAB will not grant the IPR petition. 
The PTAB will decide whether to proceed after the expiration of an initial 
three-month period or three months after the preliminary response.66 The peti-
tioner is estopped from reasserting arguments raised during the IPR, or argu-
ments that could have reasonably been raised during the IPR before the PTAB 
and a federal district court.67 The PTAB’s decision whether to institute an IPR 
is final and cannot be appealed to the PTAB, but parties may file for a rehear-
ing, or appeal to the Federal Circuit.68 
If the petition for an IPR is granted, the IPR can terminate if the parties 
reach settlement, or the IPR can proceed without the challenger until the 
PTAB’s final determination, which is issued within a year from the petition’s 
filing.69 The PTAB is likely to cancel challenged patents once IPR is instituted 
“due to its high rate of finding claims unpatentable.”70 Further, if the IPR re-
sults in any patent invalidations, any litigation in connection with those patents 
effectively ends.71 However, an individual is unable to challenge a patent’s va-
lidity through an IPR if: (1) the party petitions for an IPR within nine months of 
the patent being granted; (2) the party filed a civil suit challenging the same pa-
tent prior to filing the IPR petition; (3) “the party filed the [IPR] petition more 
than a year after service of lawsuit involving the same patent; [and (4)] the par-
ty is estopped from filing a petition for some other reason.”72 
C. Build On or Build Around73 
Patent law provides authors and inventors the exclusive rights of their in-
novations for twenty years from the filing date.74 The ultimate goal of patent 
law is social welfare and the development of the nation’s technological edge.75 
As such, patent law provides a means by which patent owners may benefit so-
ciety. Patent owners may commit their patented innovation to public domain, 
                                                        
65  Ojemen, supra note 4, at 659. 
66  35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2012). 
67  See id. § 314(d). 
68  Id. 
69  U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 57. 
70  Ojemen, supra note 4, at 665. 
71  FISH & RICHARDSON PC, A GUIDE TO PATENT LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURT (Lawrence 
K. Kolodney ed., 2018), https://www.fr.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018-A-Guide-to-
Patent-Litigation-in-Federal-Court.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GV7-CHLZ]. 
72  Ojemen, supra note 4, at 658. 
73  See generally Christopher Buccafusco et al., The Nature of Sequential Innovation, 59 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2017). 
74  35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). The patent system has set a twenty-year period because patents 
are generally more valuable right after their creation. Id. 
75  RAMAN MITTAL, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW & MANAGEMENT 13 (2011). 
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they may assign all their exclusive rights to another person, or they may pick 
and choose who may use their patent.76 
Patent law provides a means for others to engage in activities that implicate 
the exclusive rights of authors and inventors—a license from the patent own-
er.77 The patent owner authorizes the licensee to engage in activities that would 
otherwise implicate the patent owner’s exclusive rights and constitute in-
fringement.78 Patent owners in turn receive patent royalty payments from the 
licensee as consideration for the license.79 
Still, the patent owner retains ownership over the patent.80 Essentially, the 
patent owner is consenting to the use of his patent by a third party, and is prom-
ising not to exercise his right to sue this third-party for borrowing his exclusive 
rights to the patent; granted the use of the patent is according to the terms of 
their licensing agreement.81 Hence, a license does not confer any interest on the 
licensee; rather it makes “lawful that which would otherwise be unlawful.”82 
Full rights of ownership do not accompany a license.83 A license includes 
only a fraction of the patent owner’s rights, which are determined by the patent 
owner.84 Intellectual property is intangible and allows the patent owner to con-
tinue to use its patent fully without any interruption from licensees, making li-
censing of patents extremely profitable for patent owners.85 
The policies underlying patent law are the basis for licensing. Without pa-
tent law and the ability to license, others could borrow and take freely from pa-
tent owners, discouraging authors and inventors to continue to waste their mon-
ey and time creating new innovations.86 It follows that without such licensing, 
other authors and inventors would have to wait until the patent owners’ twenty-
year period is over and the patent enters the public domain to avoid infringe-
ment of the patent owner’s exclusive rights.87 Such a system could impede new 
                                                        
76  The assignment of a patent owner’s exclusive rights is the transfer of all those exclusive 
rights to another person, much like the sale of property. Id. at 2. 
77  Buccafusco et al., supra note 73, at 19. 
78  MITTAL, supra note 75, at 63; Buccafusco et al., supra note 73, at 19–20. 
79  MITTAL, supra note 75, at 1. 
80  Id. 
81  Freedom of contract allows patent owners to choose licensees and determine what rights 
these licensees have. As such, basic contract principles apply to licensing agreements. Id. at 
1, 3. 
82  Id. at 63. 
83  Id. at 64. 
84  A patent owner can set different limitations on the licensee’s use of the patent, such as 
geographic, time, and restricted to a particular use. Id. at 67–69. 
85  Id. at 2. 
86  See Buccafusco et al., supra note 73, at 20. 
87  Id. at 19, 21. 
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innovations. New authors and inventors have the option of either creating 
something new around the patent owners’ rights or obtaining licenses.88 
There are several different licenses. Due to the intangible nature of intellec-
tual property, patent owner’s exclusive rights may be split up in different 
ways.89 An exclusive license divests the licensor the right to grant any other li-
censes of the same rights licensed.90 The licensor can still grant several exclu-
sive licenses, but cannot grant more than one license granting the same rights.91 
Through protective mechanisms, patent law advances the U.S. Constitution’s 
goal to maximize social welfare with new innovations. 
II. THE KING CAN DO NO WRONG: THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
This section briefly explores the substantial literature on the sovereign im-
munity doctrine. Of particular relevance are the similarities across state, feder-
al, and foreign, and any limitations on these immunities’ scope. The back-
ground of the sovereign immunity doctrine supports a thorough understanding 
of the roots of tribal sovereign immunity and its scope. 
Sovereign immunity is the judicial doctrine protecting sovereign states by 
forbidding claims against a sovereign without the sovereign’s consent.92 A sov-
ereign enjoys immunity from its own and other sovereigns’ courts.93 Sovereign 
immunity is premised upon the idea that “the King c[ould] do no wrong” be-
cause he was the sovereign and the source of the law.94 As such, it is only right 
that the King have sovereign immunity in his own courts.95 
                                                        
88  Id. at 21. The twenty-year period intends to protect the patents during the time that they 
are most valuable. It is never wise for others wanting to borrow patent owners’ exclusive 
rights to wait out the twenty-year period because as a patent’s value diminishes quickly, it is 
very likely that any new innovation depending on that patent is also likely to diminish in 
value. As such, subsequent innovations borrowing from other patents are most valuable 
when first created. Id. at 19–20. 
89  Other types of licenses include the non-exclusive license which permits the licensor to 
grant other licenses. MITTAL, supra note 75, at 83. Also, the sole license, co-exclusive li-
cense, compulsory license, implied license, and statutory license. Id. at 79–85. 
90  Id. at 80. 
91  For example, one exclusive license may grant the licensee with exclusive rights to a par-
ticular territory, Africa, another for Europe, and another exclusive license may grant another 
licensee with the exclusive rights to a particular field of use. This maximizes a patent own-
er’s profits. Id. 
92  William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1587, 1611 (2013); McLish, supra note 5, at 173–74; Sue Woodrow, Tribal Sover-
eign Immunity: An Obstacle for Non-Indians Doing Business in Indian Country?, 
COMMUNITY DIVIDEND (Jul. 1, 1998), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/communi 
ty-dividend/tribal-sovereign-immunity-an-obstacle-for-nonindians-doing-business-in-indian-
country [https://perma.cc/3GD3-L9BM]. 
93  Wood, supra note 92, at 1611. The origins of foreign sovereign immunity are not clear. 
Id. 
94  McLish, supra note 5, at 174 (alteration in original) (citing CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST 
STATE GOVERNMENT, ITS DIVISIONS, AGENCIES, AND OFFICERS 13 (W. Winborne ed., 1982)). 
95  Id. 
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The justification for sovereign immunity doctrine “was replaced by a ra-
tionale emphasizing the doctrine’s benefit to society.”96 The justifications for 
sovereign immunity changed with the developments of “the notion that sover-
eignty is embodied in the people.”97 American courts accepted the idea that “it 
is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should 
suffer an inconvenience.”98 American courts found that sovereign immunity 
benefits American society because it protects the “public interest and conven-
ience by preventing [the exhaustion] of the sovereign’s funds through payment 
of damage awards” or through the defense of various suits.99 Further, society is 
protected from the “disruption of the orderly administration of government 
caused by the constant threat of legal action.”100 
The King also enjoys immunity from another’s courts. The notion of for-
eign sovereign immunity is rooted in principles of sovereign independence and 
developed because a sovereign state101 is independent, not subject to any other 
power or state.102 It retains all authority, rights, and power “to regulate its inter-
nal affairs without foreign interference.”103 As such, the King should enjoy the 
protections in other nations’ courts, similar to the protections afforded to him at 
home.104 All states and nations are considered to be legally equal, hence no 
state could be subject to the jurisdiction of another.105 Sovereigns recognized 
that it is in their best interest to avoid conflict and to reciprocate courtesies.106 
Accordingly, the courts recognized foreign immunity from suit.107 
A. Federal, State and Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
In the United States federal, state, and local governments enjoy immunity 
from suits.108 Sovereign immunity is derived from history, as a fundamental as-
pect of sovereignty.109 When the United States was founded, the states under-
                                                        
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Russell v. Men of Devon (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362; McLish, supra note 5, at 174. 
99  McLish, supra note 5, at 174; see also Purpose of Immunity § 1.2 in, 1 CIV. ACTIONS 
AGAINST STATE & LOC. GOV’T (2018). 
100  McLish, supra note 5, at 174; see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must 
Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383, 383–84 (1970). 
101  “State” in this context refers to independent bodies of government, thus “state” includes 
countries. Sovereign State, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
102  Woodrow, supra note 92, at 1611. 
103  Id. 
104  McLish, supra note 5, at 174. 
105  Id. at 176. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 173. Much like the King that could do no wrong as he was the source of the law, 
the government cannot be compelled by the courts because it is the source of law that creates 
the courts in the first place. Id. at 174. 
109  Wood, supra note 92, at 1611. 
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stood that “their newly-formed national government [and the states were] to 
have sovereign immunity.”110 The federal government’s immunity is not refer-
enced in the Constitution.111 Rather, it was “simply taken as a given”112 because 
it was an established doctrine inherited from English common law.113 
The states enjoy sovereign immunity because the states existed as inde-
pendent sovereigns before the Constitution.114 A state’s sovereign immunity 
derives from the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution,115 and 
the Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment in 
Hans v. Louisiana116 and later in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak.117 Fur-
ther, in Northern Insurance Co. of New York v. Chatham County, the Supreme 
Court found “arms of the State [also] possess immunity from suits.”118 
Foreign nations also enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in United States 
courts.119 Relying on the same principles of state and federal sovereign im-
munity, the Supreme Court concluded that the United States could not subject a 
foreign sovereign government to suit in United States courts—federal or 
state.120 In Schooner Exchange Chief Justice Marshall explained that “the 
whole civilized world concurred” with these principles of sovereign immunity 
because it was necessary for international relations, and it would be wrongful 
for the United States to violate the established custom without prior notice.121 
                                                        
110  Id. 
111  Id. at 1613–14. 
112  Id. at 1613. 
113  Id. at 1610–11. See generally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411–12 (1821) 
(recognizing the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity and is cited as first occasion); Vicki 
C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independ-
ence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 523 n.5 (2003) (stating that Cohens is “[t]he first 
clear reference to the sovereign immunity of the United States” despite Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335–36 (1816), “an earlier but more ambiguous reference”). 
114  Wood, supra note 92, at 1614. 
115  The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. “The Eleventh Amendment does not preclude private parties 
from seeking money damages against state officers in their personal capacity or injunctive 
relief against state officers in their official capacity to prevent ongoing violations of federal 
law.” Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Pri-
vate Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 275 n.7 (2002). 
116  Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). 
117  “[T]he judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty” because “the States 
entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact” and “a state will therefore not be 
subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to suit.” Blatchford v. Native Vill. of 
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). 
118  N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham Cty., 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006). 
119  28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012). 
120  Schooner Exch. v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). 
121  Id. 
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B. The Scope of Federal, State, and Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
The scope of state, federal, and foreign sovereign immunity is not absolute. 
A private party may not sue a sovereign unless Congress has unequivocally ab-
rogated its immunity or the sovereign expressly waives122 its immunity and 
consents to suit.123 Congress may abrogate a sovereign’s immunity only “when 
it both unequivocally intends to do so and ‘act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of 
constitutional authority.’ ”124 For Congress to “unequivocally intend” to abro-
gate a sovereign’s immunity, Congress must express such intent in plain and 
unambiguous terms.125 
1. Federal 
The federal government has not liberally abrogated its immunity.126 Most 
of the federal government’s immunity has been limited by statute in only par-
ticular circumstances.127 Congress, through explicit legislation, has set forth 
limitations on the immunity the federal government enjoys.128 
The federal government does not enjoy sovereign immunity when the fed-
eral government is acting in a predominantly commercial capacity, because, it 
is not acting in its governmental capacity.129 For example, federal corporations 
created by the United States do not enjoy the sovereign immunity of the federal 
government because of the corporations’ predominantly commercial pur-
                                                        
122  A state waives its immunity when it fails to raise the immunity as a defense at trial, by a 
private agreement, or acceptance of federal benefits made conditional on waiver of immunity 
from federal claims. Bohannan, supra note 115, at 289, 292, 303. Although Bohannan ulti-
mately concludes a state does not waive its immunity by failing to raise the defense at trial, 
cases have consistently held to the contrary. 
“Eleventh Amendment immunity is an affirmative defense that must be raised ‘early in the pro-
ceedings’ to provide ‘fair warning’ to the plaintiff.” Because it is an affirmative defense, it can 
be waived. “The test employed to determine whether a state has waived immunity ‘is a stringent 
one.’ ” “A state generally waives its immunity when it ‘voluntarily invokes [federal] jurisdiction 
or . . . makes a “clear declaration” that it intends to submit itself to [federal] jurisdiction.’ ” “Ex-
press waiver is not required; a state ‘waive[s] its Eleventh Amendment immunity by conduct 
that is incompatible with an intent to preserve that immunity.’ ” 
Aholelei v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)) (first quote), and In 
re Bliemeister, 296 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2002) (second through fourth quote). 
123  N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 547 U.S. at 195; McLish, supra note 5, at 177. 
124  Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)). 
125  Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 375–76 (8th Cir. 1895) (holding the first 
explicit invocation of tribal immunity in a published federal court opinion). 
126  McLish, supra note 5, at 175–76. 
127  Id. at 176. 
128  Wood, supra note 92, at 1610; McLish, supra note 5, at 176. 
129  McLish, supra note 5, at 176. 
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pose.130 In fact, Congress must expressly grant the federal corporations immun-
ity.131 
Further, Congress has limited the scope of federal immunity for citizens 
who would otherwise bear losses. The Federal Tort Claims Act abrogates fed-
eral immunity by allowing tort actions against the federal government. Further, 
the federal civil rights laws allow for contract actions, and the Tucker Act al-
lows for other actions that would otherwise be barred by sovereign immunity, 
such as actions founded upon the Constitution or any Act of Congress.132 
2. States 
States’ sovereign immunity is not congruent with that which the federal 
government enjoys. The Eleventh Amendment only protects states against suits 
“commenced or prosecuted . . . by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.”133 Hence, the states are only immune from pri-
vate actions. The Eleventh Amendment does not protect the states from suits 
commenced or prosecuted by the United States.134 The United States may sue 
the states regardless of Congress’ authorization.135 
Further, “states are not required to recognize the immunity of sister 
states.”136 As such, when a state is sued in a sister state’s court, the state’s sov-
ereign immunity is a “matter of common law directed by the fornm [sic] state’s 
policy.”137 Sovereign immunity between sister states is similar to the immunity 
of foreign sovereigns and federal courts because it comes from agreements be-
tween the sovereign states, and comity.138 
Congress has limited the scope of sovereign immunity the states enjoy. 
Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity when it is enforcing the constitu-
tional rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.139 Congress may deem 
                                                        
130  Id. 
131  Id.; see also Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 389 (1939) 
(holding that a federal corporation was not immune to suit, however “Congress may, of 
course, endow a governmental corporation with the government’s immunity”). 
132  28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2012); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2012). 
133  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
134  United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965); see also United States v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 19, 26–28 (1947); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 180, 185 (1936); 
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 621, 626 (1892). 
135  United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 140; see also United States v. California, 332 
U.S. at 27; United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 185; United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 
621. 
136  McLish, supra note 5, at 177. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. at 177–78. 
139  Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the 
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement 
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 
(1890)). “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
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it appropriate to allow private parties to sue the state or state officials to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment.140 
Hence, Congress has abrogated states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from Title VII sex-based retaliation claims.141 Congress abrogated this immuni-
ty after it identified a state’s pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender and the lack of a forum to protect equal employ-
ment.142 “Title VII was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,”143 
thus Title VII trumps states’ immunity. Congress has also abrogated states’ 
immunity for violations of the Age Discrimination Enforcement Act, the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, the Copyright Act, and the American with Disabilities 
Act.144 
State courts have also limited their own immunity.145 The decision of states 
to severely limit their own immunity emphasizes the injustice that results from 
a blanket assertion of immunity.146 Sovereign immunity protects the state from 
all suits against it in its own courts, thus forcing plaintiffs to endure the “losses 
caused by otherwise actionable wrongs.”147 States’ self-limitations can be in-
terpreted as states recognizing that it is unjust to leave citizens without a reme-
dy when the state harms them. 
                                                                                                                                
sions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Bohannan, supra note 115, at 338; Traci 
Dreher Quigley, Commercialization of the State University: Why the Intellectual Property 
Protection Restoration Act of 2003 is Necessary, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2009 (2004). In 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court held that Congress could not rely on Article I 
of the Constitution to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Flori-
da, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996). A discussion of Congress’s power to abrogate sovereign im-
munity is beyond the scope of this Note. 
140  Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. 
141  Crumpacker v. Kan. Dep’t. of Human Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 2003). 
142  Id. at 1170. 
143  Wilson v. Wayne Cty., 856 F. Supp. 1254, 1263 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). 
144  29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (2012) (providing that “[a]ny person aggrieved may bring a civil 
action in any Federal district court”); Osage Tribal Council ex rel. Osage Tribe of Indians v. 
U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999). This is a non-exhaustive list of 
the abrogation of states’ sovereign immunity. See 17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2012) (providing that 
“[a]ny State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instru-
mentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune, under the 
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental 
or nongovernmental entity, for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright own-
er”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12188, 12202 (2012) (providing a general cause of action for “any person 
who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of this sub-
chapter,” and “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction 
for a violation of this chapter.”). 
145  McLish, supra note 5, at 174. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
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States have drawn distinctions between the state’s governmental acts and 
proprietary acts,148 as a means to satisfy competing state interests. The state is 
held liable for its actions when the suits arise out of proprietary actions.149 Yet 
the state is not liable for suits arising out of governmental acts because the state 
enjoys sovereign immunity.150 The distinction states make between the capacity 
of their actions have severely limited states’ sovereign immunity.151 
3. Foreign Sovereigns 
Regarding foreign sovereign immunity, Congress limits foreign sovereign 
immunity when the sovereign engages in commercial activity.152 The restrictive 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (“FSIA”), gives federal courts jurisdiction when the foreign sovereign has 
engaged in commercial activities and has allegedly caused damages during 
those activities.153 Under Schooner Exchange, sovereign immunity protected 
foreign sovereigns from any suit.154 
In Schooner Exchange, plaintiffs sued The Schooner Exchange, a French 
warship, alleging they had rightful ownership and that the ship had been 
wrongfully seized from them by an individual acting on behalf of France.155 
The Supreme Court held that France was protected from suit from a private 
party and dismissed the case because it did not have jurisdiction to subject 
France to suit in its courts.156 Chief Justice Marshall noted that by definition of 
sovereignty “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is neces-
sarily exclusive and absolute [and i]t is susceptible of no limitation not imposed 
by itself.”157 The Court held that The Schooner Exchange, a friendly warship, 
was exempted from domestic jurisdiction when the ship entered an American 
port because the United States impliedly waived jurisdiction; the Court rea-
soned that the ship carried with it the sovereign status and privileges that ac-
company it.158 
The scope of foreign sovereign immunity, however, has narrowed. The 
“Schooner Exchange [decision] was understood to mean that foreign sover-
                                                        
148  Id. at 175. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  McLish, supra note 5, at 174–75. Implied waivers also limit a state’s sovereign immuni-
ty, such as the state’s voluntary participation as a litigant constitutes waiver of sovereign 
immunity. Id. at 175. A full discussion of a state’s waiver and consent to suit is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
152  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
153  McLish, supra note 5, at 177. 
154  Wood, supra note 92, at 1612. 
155  Schooner Exch. v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 117 (1812); Wood, supra note 92, 
at 1612. 
156  Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 143, 147. 
157  Id. at 136. 
158  Id. at 144, 146–47. 
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eigns enjoyed absolute immunity.”159 Now, the federal courts apply the restric-
tive doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the classical theory of foreign sover-
eign immunity is not accepted.160 The change in the doctrine of foreign immun-
ity came about when foreign nations began to engage in commercial 
transactions.161 The restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that 
foreign sovereigns are immune only from those suits arising out of governmen-
tal acts.162 Foreign sovereigns do not enjoy sovereign immunity from suits that 
arise out of proprietary acts.163 Therefore, claims arising out of commercial or 
proprietary acts are cognizable in federal court.164 
The FSIA provides that a foreign sovereign enjoys immunity in any United 
States court, unless an exception set forth in the FSIA applies.165 A plaintiff 
may sue a foreign state when: (1) the claim is based on the foreign state’s 
commercial activity carried on in the U.S; (2) when the claim is based on the 
foreign state’s act, which occurred in the U.S., and in connection with commer-
cial activity outside of the U.S.; and (3) when the claim is based on the foreign 
state’s act that occurred outside the U.S. in connection with commercial activi-
ty outside the U.S., but which causes a direct effect in the U.S.166 The FSIA re-
quires courts to consider the nature of the act itself, rather than the foreign 
state’s purpose for engaging in the act.167 Foreign nations are only afforded 
protection for their governmental activities.168 Accordingly, under the FSIA, a 
foreign sovereign’s immunity is frequently waived, favoring an individual’s 
right to sue.169 
Congress has used federal incentives to encourage waivers of sovereign 
immunity.170 For example, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont submitted the 
Leahy Bill—also known as the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act 
of 2003—in an attempt to remedy the existing unfairness of the sovereign im-
munity doctrine as applied to federal intellectual property rights.171 The Leahy 
Bill was introduced because “Congress could not abrogate sovereign immunity 
under the federal intellectual property laws.”172 The Leahy Bill would have re-
quired states to waive their sovereign immunity defense in any future infringe-
                                                        
159  Wood, supra note 92, at 1612. 
160  McLish, supra note 5, at 177. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. 
165  28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2012). 
166  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
167  28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2012). 
168  McLish, supra note 5, at 177. 
169  Id. 
170  Bohannan, supra note 115, at 277. 
171  Id.; see also S.1191, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted). 
172  Id. 
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ment or declaratory judgment action when states applied to obtain a patent or 
when registering a copyright or trademark.173 
The underlying reasoning for the application of sovereign immunity to 
states, the federal government, and foreign nations is largely based on already-
established principles. These principles include: sovereign immunity is inherent 
in the sovereign; it was “recognized in the common law; suits are offensive to a 
sovereign’s or state’s dignity; and/or sovereign immunity protects the states’ 
treasuries.”174 These underlying principles established tribal immunity.175 
III. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The sovereignty of Native American tribes is well-established.176 Europe-
ans treated Indian tribes as independent sovereigns existing within English ter-
ritories, and thus entered into treaties with the tribes.177 That is, Indian tribes 
had the authority to govern their internal affairs.178 After the United States de-
clared its independence from Great Britain, the United States continued the es-
tablished policy of recognizing Indian tribes as independent sovereigns, recog-
nizing their sovereign immunity and associating with tribes through treaties.179 
These treaties established the relationship between tribes and the U.S., known 
as the trust relationship.180 President Nixon emphasized the importance of the 
trust relationship between the federal government and the tribes and pressed for 
legislation permitting tribes to govern their own affairs with a maximum degree 
of autonomy.181 
Like individual states,182 Indian tribes are sovereign entities.183 Indian 
tribes’ sovereignty is codified in 25 U.S.C. § 5123, providing that “each Indian 
                                                        
173  Id. at 277–78. 
174  Wood, supra note 92, at 1621–22. 
175  Id. at 1622. 
176  Id. at 1624; History and Culture: Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance 
Act—1975, N. PLAINS RESERVATION AID, http://www.nativepartnership.org/site/PageServer? 
pagename=airc_hist_selfdeterminationact [https://perma.cc/QK62-ND62] (last visited Jan. 
12, 2019); see also Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510 
(1991); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 
506, 512 (1940); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 355 (1919); Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832); Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 374–76 (8th 
Cir. 1895). 
177  Wood, supra note 92, at 1623. 
178  Id. at 1650. 
179  Id. at 1624. 
180  Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the 
Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 
2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 457, 502 (2005). 
181  McLish, supra note 5, at 184 n.93. 
182  Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890) (reaffirming that the Eleventh Amendment of 
the Constitution provides states with immunity from suit without their consent). 
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tribe shall retain inherent sovereign power.”184 As such, tribes have the authori-
ty to govern themselves within the United States185 and they are immune from 
judicial proceedings without their express consent or abrogation by Con-
gress.186 
Indian tribes are separate from federal and state governments—they are 
“domestic dependent nations,”187 despite their “characteristics of national state-
hood.”188 The Supreme Court has noted that Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity 
is “not coextensive with that of the States.”189 Tribes enjoy a kind of higher sta-
tus than states because tribes are sovereign political entities, possessing inher-
ent sovereign authority not derived from the United States.190 As such, tribal 
sovereign immunity is a matter of federal law.191 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is crucial to Native American tribes. 
Sovereign immunity provides protection for their “resources and the promotion 
                                                                                                                                
183  McLish, supra note 5, at 178–79. The federal government and European powers have 
recognized tribes as having inherent sovereignty. Wood, supra note 92, at 1623–24. Indian 
affairs were centralized at the federal level in the Constitution because they were recognized 
as sovereigns. Id. at 1625. The U.S. Constitution provides Congress has the power “[t]o reg-
ulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes,” determining that tribes are separate from the federal government and states. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Hence, the President was given the power to make treatises with In-
dian tribes. Wood, supra note 92, at 1625. 
184  25 U.S.C. § 5123 (2012). 
185  See Wood, supra note 92, at 1627. 
186  Babcock, supra note 180, at 469 n.112; see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort 
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 
(1940). 
187  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 8, cl. 3. The political and legal standing of Indian Tribes was affirmed in three cases, what 
are known as The Marshall Trilogy. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557–59 
(1832); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17; Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 604 
(1823). Further, the Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power “to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several states, and with the Indian tribes[.]” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Tribes are not bound by the fourteenth amendment nor are they 
bound by the Bill of Rights. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884). 
188  Wood, supra note 92, at 1646. 
189  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755–56 (1998); Blatchford v. 
Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (explaining that tribal immunity is not co-
extensive with that of the States because tribes were not at the Constitutional Convention. As 
such, tribes are not parties to “the mutuality of . . . concession,” which is what “makes the 
States’ surrender of immunity from suit by sister States plausible.”). The Commerce Clause 
provides that Congress shall have the power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The 
language of the commerce clause suggests that Indian tribes are separate from the states and 
should be treated as sovereign. 
190  Bree R. Black Horse, The Risks and Benefits of Tribal Payday Lending to Tribal Sover-
eign Immunity, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 388, 397 (2013). 
191  Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756. 
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of tribal economic and social interests,”192 and because immunity protects the 
sovereign’s treasury.193 Tribes’ inherent sovereignty may be limited through 
federal statutes, treaties, or “when inconsistent with their dependent status.”194 
The first five tribal immunity cases “adopt a tribal immunity doctrine that bars 
suits on contracts, suits for injunctive relief, and all other types of actions 
. . . .”195 
Congress, however, may subject the sovereign state to suit despite the lack 
of consent.196 The abrogation doctrine explains when and how Congress may 
abrogate a sovereign state’s sovereign immunity.197 “[T]ribal immunity is no 
different than federal, state, or foreign sovereign immunity” in this fundamental 
principle.198 
A.  The Scope of Tribal Immunity 
The scope of tribal sovereign immunity is broad. Unless Congress has ex-
pressly abrogated a tribe’s immunity, the tribe is assumed to possess it.199 The 
application of tribal immunity is not limited and applies to all causes of action, 
and any prospective relief, in state or federal court.200 
Tribes enjoy immunity from suits even when the activities giving rise to 
the suit are predominantly proprietary and not governmental actions. In Okla-
homa Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 
the court refused to limit tribal immunity even though tribal businesses extend-
ed beyond tribal self-governance and internal affairs.201 The tribe had, for many 
years, sold cigarettes on tribal lands without collecting Oklahoma’s cigarette 
tax.202 The Oklahoma Tax Commission demanded that the tribe pay sales taxes 
due for four years of sales.203 Suit followed, and the Supreme Court held that 
                                                        
192  Woodrow, supra note 92. 
193  Wood, supra note 92, at 1590. 
194  Gregory Ablavsky, Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Patent Law, LEGAL AGGREGATE 
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://law.stanford.edu/2017/09/13/tribal-sovereign-immunity-and-patent-l 
aw/ [https://perma.cc/36WH-K37F]. 
195  Wood, supra note 92, at 1640. 
196  McLish, supra note 5, at 177. 
197  Id. at 181. 
198  Wood, supra note 92, at 1640. 
199  STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE 19 (2005). 
200  Wood, supra note 92, at 1622; see Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1908) 
(noting that tribes are protected from claims for damages, injunctive relief and all types of 
causes of actions because of their tribal immunity); see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n. v. S.C. 
State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002) (explaining that tribal immunity applies regard-
less of what plaintiff is seeking). 
201  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 
510 (1991). 
202  Id. at 507. 
203  Id. 
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the tribe had not waived its immunity by initiating suit in the district court be-
cause tribes were immune from counter-claims and cross-suits, absent Congres-
sional authorization to the contrary.204 Next, the Court held that the tribe was 
immune and did not have to collect sales taxes for cigarettes sold to tribal 
members, but that the tribe did have to collect sales taxes on cigarettes sold to 
non-members.205 However, the Court clarified that although Oklahoma did 
have a right to collect the sales taxes of sales to non-tribal members, there was 
no way for Oklahoma to enforce its laws by suit because of the tribe’s immuni-
ty.206 The Court avoided a discussion on the scope of sovereign immunity and 
suggested that if states find that other alternatives do not work for them, “they 
may of course seek appropriate legislation from Congress.”207 Similarly, in 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens National Bank of West Hollywood, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the tribe’s engagement in a private or commercial enterprise is 
immaterial because it is in such transactions that tribes need protection.208 The 
Court reasoned that limiting the tribe’s immunity to suits on liabilities arising 
from private transactions defeats Congress’s purpose for maintaining Tribes’ 
immunity.209 
Tribes enjoy immunity from suits arising out of commercial activities. The 
Supreme Court has generally sustained tribal immunity without drawing a dis-
tinction based on where the tribal activities giving rise to the suit occurred, or a 
distinction between governmental or commercial activities.210 In Kiowa Tribe 
of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the Kiowa tribe was not 
subject to suit in state court for breaches of contract involving commercial con-
duct off the reservation because Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity.211 The 
Court relied on Congress’ silence on the issues—Congress had not unequivo-
cally abrogated the tribe’s immunity when suits arise out of commercial activi-
ties.212 Further, the Court relied on stare decisis to make its determination.213 
Accordingly, the Court upheld tribal immunity.214 
Tribes retain immunity from suit arising out of activities off-reservation. In 
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, a tribe was operating a gaming fa-
                                                        
204  Id. at 509. 
205  Id. at 512. 
206  Id. at 514. 
207  Id. 
208  Md. Cas. Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of W. Hollywood, 361 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 
1966). 
209  Id. at 521–22. 
210  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2028 (2014); Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe, 498 U.S. at 510–11 (1991) (recognizing sovereign immunity in a suit over cigarette 
sale taxation); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 167–68 (1977) (recog-
nizing that the tribe’s claim of sovereign immunity was “well founded”). 
211  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998). 
212  Id. at 759. 
213  Id. at 753. 
214  Id. at 760. 
19 NEV. L.J. 689, OROZCO 4/18/2019  12:53 PM 
Winter 2018] TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 711 
 
cility off-reservation, involving the most highly regulated class of gaming un-
der the Indian Gaming Regulation Act (“IGRA”).215 The State sued seeking to 
enjoin the tribe from operating the gaming facility, alleging violations of the 
IGRA.216 Congress had not unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate tribal 
immunity from a state’s suit to enjoin the tribe from operating a gaming facility 
off-reservation.217 As such, the Supreme Court held that tribal immunity barred 
the suit because Congress had not abrogated the tribe’s immunity, so the court 
did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute.218 Sovereign immunity protected 
the tribe from suit, despite the fact that the activities giving rise to the claim oc-
curred off-reservation.219 In essence, courts will not easily assume that Con-
gress has intended to abrogate tribal immunity and undermine tribes’ self-
government.220 If Congress is silent, the courts will uphold tribal immunity. 
Tribes may be subject to suits under limited circumstances. Like the states’ 
sovereign immunity, tribes may not assert their immunity against the United 
States.221 Indian tribes, as dependent nations, do not enjoy immunity from suits 
commenced or prosecuted by the federal government because the United States 
is a superior sovereign.222 Tribes remain separate, and retain the power to regu-
late their people and their internal affairs; however, tribes no longer possess 
“the full attributes of sovereignty.”223 As such, tribal immunity is not implicat-
ed where the federal government “acting through an agency engages in an in-
vestigative action or pursues an adjudicatory agency action.”224 
In Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Myaln, the Federal Circuit rejected the ap-
plication of tribal immunity in IPR proceedings because IPR proceedings are 
more like a traditional agency action, rather than an action by a private party.225 
The Court relied on the decision in Federal Maritime Commission v. South 
                                                        
215  Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2028–29. 
216  Id. at 2029. 
217  Id. at 2032. 
218  Id. at 2039. 
219  Id. 
220  Id. at 2032. 
221  EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001). 
222  Id.; see also Fla. Paraplegic, Ass’n, v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 
1126, 1135 (11th Cir. 1999); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 182 (2d 
Cir. 1996); Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459–60 (9th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 827 F.2d 380, 382 (8th Cir. 1987). 
223  Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 698 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 
2012). 
224  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018); 
see, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 123 (1960); Pauma 
v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. 888 F.3d 1066, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2018); Karuk Tribe Hous. 
Auth., 260 F.3d at 1075. 
225  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1327. The Federal Circuit was careful to note that 
it was not weighing in on “whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity dif-
ferently.” Id. at 1329. 
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Carolina State Ports Authority226 (“FMC”) to make its determination and con-
cluded that IPR proceedings are unlike civil litigation for several reasons. IPR 
proceedings are more like an agency enforcement action because the PTAB Di-
rector acting on behalf of the United States has broad discretion in deciding to 
institute IPR on information supplied by a third party—it is not the private par-
ty bringing the sovereign before a tribunal.227 Second, IPR is a reconsideration 
of a prior agency action, as the IPR may continue without the private party and 
the participation of the patent owner.228 Third, the “USPTO procedures in IPR 
do not mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”229 Finally, the existence of 
the PTAB’s more inquisitorial proceedings, in which immunity does not apply, 
does not determine the application immunity in a different type of proceed-
ing.230 Ultimately, the Director’s authority convinced the Court that IPR pro-
ceedings are agency actions.231 As such, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe may not 
rely on tribal immunity to protect it from suits against the United States. 
Further, the Ex parte Young doctrine allows suits against officials acting on 
behalf of a tribe, or state, to proceed despite sovereign immunity when the state 
acted unconstitutionally.232 The doctrine only allows for plaintiffs to seek de-
claratory and injunctive relief.233 In Ex parte Young, railroad shareholders sued 
the Attorney General of Minnesota to enjoin him from enforcing a law that lim-
ited what railroads could charge in Minnesota and set forth severe penalties for 
violators, which violated the Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.234 The Attorney General asserted sovereign immunity, protecting him 
from suit by private citizens, but the Court explained that precedent did not 
preclude it from enjoining the official as an individual.235 The Court concluded 
that when a state official acts unconstitutionally, that official cannot possibly be 
acting on behalf of the state because the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 
invalidates any contrary laws.236 As such, when an official acts unconstitution-
ally, that individual is stripped of his official power and he becomes a citizen 
                                                        
226  Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (determining that 
state sovereign immunity precluded FMC from adjudicating a private party’s complaint be-
cause the FMC proceedings were overwhelming similar to civil litigation in federal court). 
227  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1327–28. 
228  Id. at 1328. 
229  Id. 
230  Id. at 1329. 
231  Id. 
232  Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908). 
233  Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Kathryn E. Fort, Advising—and Suing—Tribal Officers: On 
the Scope of Tribal Official Immunity 2–3 (Feb. 20, 2009) (unpublished research paper) 
https://www.law.msu.edu/indigenous/papers/WhitePaper200901.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UFU 
-6TXW]; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996); Keweenaw Bay 
Indian Cmty. v. Kleine, 546 F. Supp. 2d 509, 517 (W.D. Mich. 2008). 
234  Young, 209 U.S. at 129–30. 
235  Id. at 155–56. 
236  Id. at 159–60. 
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who may be brought before the court.237 Accordingly, the Attorney General did 
not enjoy the state’s sovereign immunity.238 
The Ex parte Young doctrine applies to tribal officials. The United States 
Supreme Court has suggested that the doctrine should apply to tribal officials 
who act outside the scope of their duties or who violate federal law to avoid 
tribal immunity.239 In Potawatomi, the Court stated that they have never held 
that individual tribe agents or officers are immune when the State brings suit.240 
Further, in Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, the court stated that 
sovereign immunity “does not immunize the individual members of the 
[t]ribe.”241 
B. The Abrogation of Tribal Immunity 
Tribal immunity is upheld unless the tribe has waived its immunity or 
Congress has explicitly abrogated immunity.242 Congress may narrow the scope 
of tribal immunity by setting forth limitations through explicit legislation.243 
Congress may abrogate tribal immunity only when it both unequivocally in-
tends to do so and “act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authori-
ty.”244 For congress to “unequivocally intend” to abrogate tribal immunity, 
Congress must express such intent in “plain and unambiguous terms.”245 
The Supreme Court of the United States has retained the doctrine of tribal 
immunity when Congress failed to abrogate it.246 Tribes may assert sovereign 
immunity at any stage of the litigation to have the case dismissed.247 If the 
court does not grant the tribe’s motion, the tribe does not need to wait until the 
end of trial to appeal.248 
                                                        
237  Id. at 160. 
238  Id. at 161. 
239  Fletcher & Fort, supra note 233, at 3; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
49, 59 (1978) (holding that an individual tribe member “is not protected by the tribe’s im-
munity from suit”). 
240  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 
514 (1991); Fletcher & Fort, supra note 233, at 3. 
241  Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1977). 
242  Wood, supra note 92, at 1591 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 
U.S. 751, 754 (1998)). 
243  See id. at 1597 & n.53. 
244  Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)). 
245  Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1895). Thebo was “the first 
published federal court opinion . . . explicitly invoke[ing] the tribal . . . immunity doctrine.” 
Wood, supra note 92, at 1646. 
246  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 
509 (1991). 
247  See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985); Osage Tribal Council ex rel. Osage 
Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding “the 
denial of tribal immunity is an immediately appealable collateral order”). 
248  See Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 525; Osage 187 F.3d at 1179. 
19 NEV. L.J. 689, OROZCO 4/18/2019  12:53 PM 
714 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2  
 
Congress has passed laws abrogating tribal immunity. In one instance, 
Congress authorized two tribes to sue one another to resolve a property dispute 
between them in federal court.249 Congress has allowed suits against tribes, 
states, and the federal government regarding hazardous waste disposal.250 The 
Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act of 1990 expressly waives tribal im-
munity and states that courts may require Indian tribes to relinquish to a federal 
government creditor money owed by a debtor that is in their possession, such as 
money from a tribal employee’s paycheck.251 Similarly, the IGRA unequivocal-
ly allows states that have a gaming compact with an Indian tribe to sue the tribe 
to stop a gambling activity violating the compact.252 
Further, Congress has passed laws which unequivocally state that tribal 
immunity is not waived. Congress did not abrogate tribal immunity with regard 
to Title VII.253 Congress specifically exempted Indian tribes from the definition 
of “employers” that are subject to Title VII.254 Similarly, the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 unequivocally states that 
tribal immunity is not waived.255 These laws provide that Indian tribes cannot 
be sued without their unequivocal consent. 
                                                        
249  Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 591 F.2d 1289, 1290 (9th Cir. 1979). 
250  Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 30 F.3d 1203, 1204, 1206–07 (9th 
Cir. 1994); Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1096–97 (8th Cir. 
1989). 
251  See 28 U.S.C. § 3002(7), (10) (2012); Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 
1055, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Smith, No. 2:05CR201, 2008 WL 700320, 
at *1 (W.D.N.C Mar. 13, 2008); Wood, supra note 92, at 1620. In § 106 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the text provides “sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the 
extent set forth in this section with respect to the following . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
The definition of the term “governmental unit” includes domestic governments. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(27) (2012). In Krystal Energy, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Bankruptcy Code and 
determined that Congress intended to abrogate tribal immunity when it enacted § 106, alt-
hough neither statute included the term “Indian tribes.” Krystal Energy, 357 F.3d at 1056–
57. The Court reasoned that the text of § 106 is clear on its face and unequivocally shows 
Congress’ intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of all “foreign and domestic govern-
ments” because the definition first lists subset of all governmental units, but also adds the 
catch-all phrase, “foreign and domestic governments.” Id. at 1057. Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that the phrase “foreign and domestic governments” included sovereign Indian 
tribes. Id. at 1061. 
252  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2012); Wood, supra note 92, at 1669 n.470. 
253  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (providing that the term “employer” does not include an 
Indian tribe). 
254  Id. In Nanomantube v. Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas, the tribe’s sovereign immunity re-
mained intact because Congress has explicitly exempted tribes from Title VII’s require-
ments. Nanomantube v. Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas, 631 F.3d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 2011). 
Further, the tribe did not waive their immunity through a single sentence in their casino’s 
employee handbook because the handbook did not include any information regarding tribu-
nals where disputes could be resolved. Id. at 1153. The sentence in the handbook was not an 
express and unequivocal waiver, rather it was more akin to a promise not to discriminate. Id. 
255  Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 5332 
(2012); see Wood, supra note 92, at 1663 n.444. 
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Congress has rarely abrogated tribal immunity. As such, Indian tribes are 
immune from most suits against them, unless the tribe has unequivocally ex-
pressed their consent.256 Courts dismiss cases for lack of jurisdiction based on 
tribal immunity, including suits seeking to challenge tribal membership re-
quirements,257 a tribal zoning law,258 and tribal hunting and fishing regula-
tions.259 Courts have also dismissed suits that sought recovery for a tribal 
debt,260 enforcement of a tribal lease,261 a determination of ownership of real 
property in which the tribe had an interest,262 to seize tribal assets,263 to chal-
lenge tribal election procedures or results,264 to collect state taxes that a tribe 
allegedly owed,265 damages resulting from injuries suffered by patrons266 or 
employees267 of a tribal casino, worker’s compensation from a tribe,268 damag-
es resulting from a tribe’s copyright infringement,269 damages against a tribal 
casino for serving too much alcohol to a patron who then caused an accident,270 
                                                        
256  See Wood, supra note 92, at 1590 n.13, 1591, 1597. 
257  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51–52 (1978); Ackerman v. Edwards, 17 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 517, 519–20, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
258  Trans-Canada Enters. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 475, 477 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
259  California ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Fish and Game v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 
1153, 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1979). 
260  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 760 (1998); Ramey Con-
str. Co. v. Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315, 317, 320 (10th Cir. 
1982); Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061, 1061, 1066 (1st Cir. 1979); Wells 
v. Philbrick, 486 F. Supp. 807, 808–09 (D.S.D. 1980); Hoffman v. Sandia Resort & Casino, 
232 P.3d 901, 902 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010). 
261  McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 633 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Dyer v. Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, No. 3:07-CV-00611-LRH-VPC, 2008 WL 4813099, at *1–2 (D. Nev. 
2008) (dismissing challenge to tribal decision not to renew a lease). 
262  Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass’n v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1092–93, 1105 
(9th Cir. 1994); Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1324–25 (9th Cir. 1975). 
263  Aircraft Equip. Co. v. Kiowa Tribe of Okla., 2 P.3d 338, 340–41 (Okla. 2000); North Sea 
Prods., Ltd. v. Clipper Seafoods Co., 595 P.2d 938, 942 (Wash. 1979). 
264  Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1318–19 (10th Cir. 1997); Nero v. Cherokee 
Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457, 1458–59 (10th Cir. 1989); Runs After v. United States, 766 
F.2d 347, 352–53 (8th Cir. 1985); Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d 335, 336, 339 (8th Cir. 
1983). 
265  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla, 498 U.S. 505, 507 
(1991). 
266  Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 67, 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); 
Gross v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., 601 N.W.2d 82, 82 (Iowa 1999); Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 
561 N.W.2d 889, 889 (Minn. 1997). 
267  Holmes v. St. Croix Casino, 26 Indian L. Rep. 6089, 6092, 6095 (St. Croix Trib. Ct. 
App. 1999). 
268  Adams v. Moapa Band of Paiute Indians, 991 F. Supp. 1218, 1219–20 (D. Nev. 1997); 
see also Webb v. Paragon Casino, 872 So.2d 641, 646 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
269  Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 360 (2d Cir. 2000). 
270  Cook v. Avi Casino Enters., 548 F.3d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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and damages resulting from civil rights violations.271 In dismissing cases based 
on tribal immunity, the courts rejected arguments that only the federally recog-
nized tribes are entitled to assert sovereign immunity,272 that states may waive 
tribal immunity,273 that tribal officials may be waived under federal law author-
izing suit against state officials,274 that tribes waive all immunity by waiving 
immunity for some claims,275 that tribal immunity does not apply to suits 
brought by nontribal members,276 and that a tribe’s acceptance of federal funds 
waives the tribe’s immunity from suits challenging the manner in which the 
tribe spent those funds.277 
Although the federal government has set forth legislation to clarify the sig-
nificance of Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations,”278 the contours of 
tribal sovereignty remain “murky.”279 In Kiowa, the Court noted that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity “can harm those who are unaware that they are 
dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who have no 
choice in the matter.”280 The Court expressed its concern for the potential is-
sues arising when tribes assert sovereign immunity and embraced the ability of 
Congress to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity when needed.281 In fact, the 
Court’s language urges Congress to step in.282 The Court argues that “tribal 
immunity extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-governance” 
in “our interdependent and mobile society” because tribal enterprises extend 
                                                        
271  Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1161, 1175 (10th Cir. 2006); see Seneca Tel. Co. v. 
Miami Tribe of Okla., 253 P.3d 53, 55 (Okla. 2011) (finding tribal immunity from lawsuit 
seeking damages for alleged destruction of underground telephone cables). 
272  Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061, 1065 n.5 (1st Cir. 1979); Maynes v. 
Unkechaug Tribal Council, No. 10-CV-3989(JS)(ETB), 2011 WL 43478, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 5, 2011); Gristede’s Foods, Inc. v. Unkechuage Nation, 660 F. Supp. 2d 442, 465 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
273  Bottomly, 599 F.2d at 1066; see Haile v. Saunooke, 148 F. Supp. 604, 607 (W.D.N.C. 
1957). 
274  Burrell, 456 F.3d at 1174; Kaul v. Battese, No. 03-4203-SAC, 2004 WL 1732309, at *2 
(D. Kan. Jul. 27, 2004); E.F.W. v. St. Stephen’s Mission Indian High Sch., 51 F. Supp. 2d 
1217, 1230 (D. Wyo. 1999), aff’d, 264 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2001) (if, however, a tribal po-
lice officer is cross-deputized as a state officer and is acting in that capacity at the time of the 
incident, the office may be sued under section 1983); see Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 896–
97 (9th Cir. 2009). 
275  Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 175 (Alaska 1977); see Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian 
Cmty. of Fort Belknap Reservation, 455 F. Supp. 462, 463 (D. Mont. 1978). 
276  Walton v. Pueblo, 443 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. Turtle Mountain 
Band of Chippewa Indians, 459 F. Supp. 366, 368–69 (D.N.D. 1978). 
277  Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2001). 
278  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831). 
279  Babcock, supra note 180, at 449. 
280  Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998). 
281  Id. 
282  Id. (explaining that “[t]hese considerations might suggest a need to abrogate tribal im-
munity”). 
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beyond tribal self-governance and internal affairs.283 Nonetheless, the Court has 
declined to revisit case law and defers to Congress to weigh and accommodate 
the competing policy interests.284 
Indian tribes in the United States do not enjoy absolute sovereign immuni-
ty. Few limitations have been placed on the scope sovereign immunity of tribes. 
Still, Indian tribes have a broader immunity than is recognized for other sover-
eigns.285 
IV. THE LIGHT: LEWIS V. CLARKE 
Recently, the Supreme Court determined a promising case, standing for the 
proposition that tribal immunity is no greater than that of the states.286 The Su-
preme Court held that tribal sovereign immunity is not applicable when the 
tribe is not the “real party in interest.”287 In Lewis v. Clarke, a tribal employee, 
during the course of his employment, rear-ended the plaintiffs’ vehicle outside 
reservation land, and suit ensued.288 The Court determined that tribal immunity 
did not protect the tribal employee because the remedy that the plaintiffs 
sought—money damages—did not “affect the Tribe’s ability to govern itself 
independently.”289 Sovereign immunity did not bar the suit, despite the fact that 
the tort was committed during the scope of the employee’s employment, and 
for which the tribe had indemnified the employee.290 The court reasoned that 
sovereign immunity does not extend to suits against tribal employees where the 
employee, rather than the tribe, is the “real party in interest.”291 
In Lewis, the Supreme Court draws a distinction between “individual- and 
official-capacity suits.” 292 Justice Sotomayor noted that there is a readily dis-
cernible difference between the two: suits in an official capacity seek only 
nominal relief against the official and actually seek relief against the official’s 
office, thus the sovereign itself; suits in an individual capacity seek relief only 
against the individual, and there is no recovery from the sovereign.293 When re-
                                                        
283  Id. Tribal businesses include gambling, ski resorts, and cigarette sales to non-Indians. See 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen 
Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 507 (1991); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 146 (1973); see also Lynn Armitage, 2016 Hot List: Native Businesses, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (July 25, 2016), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/bus 
iness/2016-hot-list-native-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/K8ZY-5VP2]. 
284  Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758. 
285  McLish, supra note 5, at 180. 
286  Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1293 (2017). 
287  Id. at 1289. 
288  Id. at 1290. 
289  Id. 
290  Id. at 1292. 
291  Id. at 1291. 
292  Id. at 1292. 
293  The Court explained that when sued in an official capacity, individuals who leave office 
are automatically replaced in the litigation by their successors. Id. at 1292; see Will v. Mich. 
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lief is in fact sought from the sovereign, the sovereign is the real party in inter-
est.294 Only those suits in an official capacity were subject to the protections of 
sovereign immunity.295 
In lawsuits against state and federal employees, precedent requires looking 
to the real party in interest to determine whether sovereign immunity bars the 
suit.296 To make such a determination, the courts must look beyond what is 
characterized in the complaint and ascertain “whether the remedy sought is tru-
ly against the sovereign.”297 The “real party in interest” reasoning allows for 
arms and instrumentalities of the state to also enjoy the state’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.298 As such, suits against employees in their official ca-
pacity generally “represent only another way of pleading an action against an 
entity of which an officer is an agent.”299 
Similarly, corporations and commercial entities enjoy the tribe’s immunity 
if the commercial entity is an “arm of the tribe.”300 To determine whether the 
commercial entity is an arm of the tribe, courts consider several factors, such as 
the manner in which the commercial entity was created, its purpose, how the 
entity is being funded and controlled, what resources the entity uses and man-
                                                                                                                                
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620, 622 
(1963). 
294  Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1292. 
295  Id. 
296  Id.; see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29–30 (1991) (holding that state officials may be 
sued for money damages in their individual capacity because the Eleventh Amendment did 
not bar such suits). 
297  Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1291; see Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25–27 (“Personal-capacity suits, on the 
other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken 
under color of state law. . . . [O]fficers sued in their personal capacity come to court as indi-
viduals.”); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663–65 (1974); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Larson v. Domestic and Foreign 
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687 (1949) (holding the judgement “will not require action 
by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign’s property”). 
298  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429–30 (1997) (quoting Ford Motor Co. 
v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)) (“[W]hen the action is in essence one for the 
recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is enti-
tled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal 
defendants.”). 
299  Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1292 (2017) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 
(1985)); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)) (“Personal-capacity suits seek to impose person-
al liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official-
capacity suits, in contrast, ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action 
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ ”) (citation omitted); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. 
300  Cook v. Avi Casino Enters., 548 F.3d 718, 725–26 (9th Cir. 2008); Allen v. Gold Coun-
try Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006); Ninegret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian 
Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2000); Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. 
Native Wholesale Supply, 237 P.3d 199, 210 (Okla. 2010) (denying sovereign status to an 
Indian corporation); Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. Cmty. Fund, Inc., 658 N.E.2d 989, 
992–93 (N.Y. 1995). 
19 NEV. L.J. 689, OROZCO 4/18/2019  12:53 PM 
Winter 2018] TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 719 
 
ages, what authority the tribe maintains in hiring and firing employees, and 
whether suit against the commercial entity impacts the tribe’s fiscal re-
sources.301 
The Court in Lewis found no reason to depart from these established rules 
when considering cases involving sovereign immunity.302 The Court employed 
the “real party in interest” reasoning and focused its sovereign immunity analy-
sis on the remedy sought.303 The Court identified the employee as the real party 
in interest because the damages sought were only against him.304 The tribe was 
not implicated whatsoever.305 As precedent points out, if the defendant in Lewis 
were a state employee, rather than a tribal employee, the case would be an indi-
vidual one, and the defendant would not be afforded the protections of the 
state’s immunity.306 The court stated that there is no reason that the sovereign 
immunity rules should differ between states and tribes.307 Logically then, the 
tribe’s immunity could not extend to the defendant in Lewis because he was 
sued in an individual capacity, although the tort committed was within the 
scope of his employment and he was indemnified by the tribe.308 The Court’s 
reliance on these rules to make its determination did not abrogate the tribe’s 
immunity.309 The tribe’s immunity is clearly not at play in this case. 
The court noted that tribal immunity should not extend to protect the em-
ployee simply because the tort occurred within the scope of his employment.310 
Doing so would allow sovereign immunity to extend beyond that which is nec-
essary for the tribe to govern itself.311 To broaden the scope of tribal immunity 
                                                        
301  See Breakthrough Mgt. Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 
1181 (10th Cir. 2010) (granting immunity); Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco 
Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1293–95 (10th Cir. 2008) (granting immunity); Cook, 548 F.3d at 726 
(granting immunity); Runyon v. Ass’n of Vill. Council Presidents, 84 P.3d 437, 440–41 
(Alaska 2004) (denying immunity). 
302  Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1292. 
303  Id.; see Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921) (explaining that court should look 
to the “essential nature and effect of the proceeding, as it appears from the entire record” be-
cause more than the mere names of the parties on the complaint is needed to determine who 
is the real party in interest); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 488 (1887) (quoting Osborn v. Bank 
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 858 (1824)) (finding the key question is 
“whether they are to be considered as having a real interest, or as being only nominal par-
ties.”); see also Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 67 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 
711, 720 (1883). 
304  Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1292. 
305  Id. 
306  Morgan v. Colo. River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421, 424 n.1 (Ariz. 1968). 
307  Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1293. 
308  Id. at 1292–93. 
309  Id. at 1293. 
310  Id. at 1292. 
311  Id. at 1292–93; see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (holding that the 
“exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot 
survive without express congressional delegation.”). 
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and extend it to tribal employees is against the common law principles that es-
tablished state, federal, and foreign sovereign immunity.312 Accordingly, rely-
ing on the established principles underlying state sovereign immunity, the 
Court concluded that tribal immunity does not bar suits against the employee in 
his individual capacity.313 
Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg concurred separately, arguing that the 
case should have been decided on simpler grounds.314 Justice Thomas main-
tains the view that tribal immunity should not bar suits against the employee 
simply because the activities giving rise to the cause of action occurred beyond 
the tribe’s territory.315 Further, the acts giving rise to the suit were commercial 
and not in furtherance of the tribe’s governance or internal affairs.316 Justice 
Ginsburg’s argument is akin to that of Justice Thomas, except that she also 
suggests that tribes that interact with nontribal members beyond the tribe’s ter-
ritory “should be subject to nondiscriminatory state laws of general applica-
tion.”317 
V. TRIBAL IMMUNITY VERSUS STATE, FEDERAL, AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY 
There are notable differences between the sovereign immunity that tribes 
enjoy and the immunity that states, the federal government, and foreign nations 
enjoy. The protections of tribal immunity are considerably broader than the 
protections afforded to states, the federal government, and foreign nations. 
There are two significant limitations to state, federal, and foreign sovereign 
immunity that tribal immunity is not subjected to. Admittedly, it is argued that 
such differences in the scope of tribal immunity are justified because tribes are 
of a higher status than states, and that their immunity is not derived from the 
Constitution; rather, tribes have this inherent authority and immunity. However, 
this argument is insufficient to support the differences in scope between the 
immunity enjoyed by sovereigns. A comparison between the immunity enjoyed 
by the state, the federal government, foreign nations, and tribes will demon-
strate the need to limit the scope of tribal immunity. 
It is significant to note that foreign nations and tribal immunities are both 
similar in one respect—their power is inherent because they are sovereigns, un-
                                                        
312  Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1292–93. 
313  Id. The Court also determined that an indemnification provision is insufficient to extend 
tribal immunity to individual employees who would otherwise not be protected by tribal 
immunity. Id. at 1293. The relevant question in the case was what party would be legally 
bound by an adverse decision, not the party from whom relief is sought. Id. at 1293–94. As 
such, the indemnification provision does not turn the suit against the employee into a suit 
against the tribe. Id. at 1294. 
314  Id. at 1295 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1295–96 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
315  Id. at 1295 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
316  Id. 
317  Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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like the states’ power that is derived from the Eleventh Amendment.318 Sover-
eign immunity of foreign sovereigns, federal courts, and tribes because it 
comes from agreements between the sovereigns and comity.319 It follows logi-
cally then, that tribes should be treated no different. A foreign nation’s immuni-
ty is grounded in international comity and respect so as to not disrupt the ami-
cable relations between nations.320 
A. Commercial Activities 
The first important difference between the immunity enjoyed by states, 
federal government, foreign nations, and tribes is the distinction of the nature of 
the sovereign’s activities. The sovereign immunity that states, the federal gov-
ernment, and foreign sovereigns enjoy make a distinction between the sover-
eign’s governmental acts and its proprietary acts, of which only the former en-
joys immunity from suit.321 
In contrast, tribes are not subject to suit in United States courts even if they 
engage in commercial activities giving rise to the cause of action.322 There are 
no such exceptions to the applicability of tribal immunity. Tribal business en-
terprises enjoy the protections of tribal immunity by default, unlike federal cor-
porations which require Congress’ approval.323 Tribes are not subject to suit 
even when their commercial activities cause a direct effect on the United 
States, as foreign sovereigns are subjected under the FSIA.324 Tribes’ commer-
cial activities are no different. In fact, it is immaterial whether a tribe’s actions 
are commercial or governmental, or whether their acts cause a direct effect on 
the United States. 
Tribes, however, enjoy close to absolute immunity. They are protected 
from suit in United States courts for their proprietary and commercial actions, 
whether the acts at issue have any relation to their ability to self-govern or re-
                                                        
318  The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign 
state.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 5 (1890). 
319  McLish, supra note 5, at 177. 
320  Id. at 176. 
321  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012); McLish, supra note 5, at 175. 
322  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2028 (2014) (holding tribal sover-
eign immunity barred a suit arising out of activities which occurred off reservation); Okla. 
Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991) (rec-
ognizing sovereign immunity in a suit over cigarette sale taxation); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 167–68 (1977) (recognizing that the tribe’s claim of sovereign 
immunity was “well founded” without a discussion on the relevance of where the commer-
cial activities giving rise to the suit took place). 
323  McLish, supra note 5, at 176; see also Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 
U.S. 381, 389 (1939) (holding that a federal corporation was not immune to suit, however 
“Congress may, of course, endow a governmental corporation with the government’s im-
munity.”). 
324  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
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late to their internal affairs.325 The rules for sovereign immunity should not dif-
fer depending on who the sovereign is—whether the sovereign is a state, a for-
eign nation or a tribe. When determining whether tribal immunity applies, 
courts should consider the nature of the act itself, rather than the sovereign’s 
purpose for engaging in the act. Accordingly, a Tribe’s immunity should be 
frequently waived, favoring an individual’s right to sue. 
B. Off-Reservation Activities 
Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from suits arising from acts occur-
ring on- or off-reservation. Further, it is immaterial whether Tribes’ commer-
cial on-reservation activities directly affect the United States. Tribal sovereign 
immunity does not depend on the location of the act giving rise to the suit or 
the effect of the act on the United States. 
Tribes and foreign sovereigns are not held to the same standards. Tribes 
should be subject to suit for acts occurring off-reservation and tribes should al-
so be subject to suit for commercial acts occurring on-reservation that have a 
direct effect on the United States. No other sovereign enjoys a similar extent of 
immunity. FSIA subjects foreign sovereigns to suit in such circumstances.326 In 
a tribal immunity case, if the defendant had been a foreign sovereign it would 
be subject to suit. It is clear that there are significant differences between the 
immunity that other sovereigns enjoy and that which tribes enjoy, and there is 
no logical explanation why tribes enjoy a broader immunity. Tribes should not 
enjoy immunity from actions arising out of actions occurring off-reservation 
nor should they enjoy immunity from on-reservation activities that have a di-
rect effect on the United States. 
C. Tribal Immunity: Contrary to the Underlying Principles of Sovereign 
Immunity 
The underlying principles of sovereign immunity do not justify the differ-
ences in scope. Sovereign immunity is rationalized as a benefit to society, be-
cause it prevents the public from suffering an inconvenience. The immunity 
that tribes enjoy is beyond what is necessary for the tribes’ self-governance and 
internal affairs. Many tribes’ commercial activities extend beyond what the 
tribes’ governments need. Tribal immunity remains intact, despite the devel-
opments in our modern society and the tribes’ involvement in sophisticated 
commercial transactions. 
Admittedly, it is important that tribes are not under constant threat of suits. 
The constant threat of suits—or actually defending those suits—would drain 
tribes’ resources. Additionally, it is important to protect tribes from the disrup-
                                                        
325  McLish, supra note 5, at 180. 
326  See supra Section II.B.3. 
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tion of the administration of their government. Still, tribal immunity extends 
beyond the scope of the needs justifying sovereign immunity. 
Tribal enterprises are proliferating and the inequities generated by unwar-
ranted tribal immunity have multiplied. These enterprises extend beyond tradi-
tional tribal customs and activities. The Supreme Court in its previous decisions 
upholding tribal immunity has been unwilling to address the issue, relying on 
stare decisis to make its determination and deferring to Congress. The ration-
ales underlying sovereign immunity, such as considerations of comity, and pro-
tection of tribal self-governance and tribal internal affairs, do not support ex-
tending tribal immunity to tribal commercial activities occurring off 
reservations and affecting the United States directly. 
The previous Supreme Court rulings extending sovereign immunity beyond 
tribes’ territory are unsupported. Adhering to the reasoning of state, federal, 
and foreign immunity would limit the scope of tribal immunity. The Court and 
Congress have failed to tailor tribal immunity to their numerous modern com-
mercial enterprises. Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Bay Mills Indian 
Community, expounds the Kiowa decision; it criticizes the Court because, in 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, the Court did not defer to Congress in its determina-
tion that immunity barred the suit; rather the Court, in upholding sovereign 
immunity, despite that the activities were commercial and off-reservation, cre-
ated law.327 Indeed, the Court set forth precedent that barred suits against tribes 
and left plaintiffs to withstand the loses of being unable to seek relief for their 
otherwise actionable wrongs. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Blackmun expressed that the tribal immunity doctrine “may well 
merit re-examination in an appropriate case.”328 After the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Lewis v. Clarke, it is clear that the sentiments that Justice Blackmun 
expressed years ago are still pertinent today. Moreover, the recent exploitation 
of tribal sovereign immunity warrants re-examination and supports Congress’ 
need to restrict tribal immunity. Tribal immunity jurisprudence was in dire need 
of an opinion like Lewis v. Clarke to clarify the boundaries of tribal immunity 
and inspire Congress to abrogate the almost-absolute immunity that tribes en-
joy. 
The Lewis opinion sheds light on future tribal immunity decisions. Justice 
Blackmun and Justice Scalia were concerned with the use of tribal immunity as 
in the agreement between Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.329 The 
                                                        
327  Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
328  Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 178–79 (1977) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring). 
329  Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. at 2045 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 
433 U.S. at 178–79 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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scope of tribal immunity is extending beyond what is necessary for tribes’ self-
governance and internal affairs. The immunity agreement may have aroused 
enough controversy, mandating Congress to act. 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan 
Pharm. Inc. justly rejects the application of tribal immunity in IPR proceed-
ings.330 Both the Lewis court and the Federal Circuit applied principles underly-
ing state sovereign immunity to make a determination about the scope of tribal 
immunity.331 Admittedly, the “contours of tribal sovereign immunity differ 
from those of state sovereign immunity,” but case law regarding the application 
of state sovereign immunity is “instructive.”332 
The PTAB and the Federal Circuit correctly denied the Saint Regis Mo-
hawk tribe’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign im-
munity, and the Federal Circuit correctly affirmed the PTAB’s decision.333 The 
Court’s analysis in Lewis supports the PTAB’s decision. First, the Lewis court 
clarified that tribal immunity should not extend beyond the scope of what is 
necessary to protect tribes’ self-governance and internal affairs.334 The immuni-
ty agreement between Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe at issue be-
fore the PTAB was a commercial transaction, not at all related to the self-
governance of the tribe or its internal affairs.335 The transaction was purely 
commercial—it was an extremely lucrative deal for both parties, resulting in 
billions in profit for the tribe and providing Allergan with exclusive rights to 
those patents.336 In fact, the Federal Court’s ruling “is a setback for Allergan, 
which paid Saint Regis $13.75 million [and $15 million a year in royalties] . . . 
to take ownership of the patents.”337 In Lewis, the Court emphasized “there is 
no reason” for the distinction in the immunity that states and tribes enjoy.338 As 
such, the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s commercial activities should not be af-
forded the protections of tribal immunity. 
The Federal Circuit’s decision, however, is narrow and does not resolve the 
issue. The Federal Circuit did not address Mylan’s arguments that the Mohawk 
tribe’s use of tribal immunity is an attempt to “market an exception” and that 
                                                        
330  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
331  Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1293 (2017); Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 
1326. 
332  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1326. 
333  Id. at 1325. 
334  Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1292–93. 
335  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1325. 
336  Mathew Bultman, Sens. Seek Investigation of Allergan’s Patent Deal with Tribe, 
LAW360 (Sept. 27, 2017, 6:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/968797/sens-seek-
investigation-of-allergan-s-patent-deal-with-tribe [https://perma.cc/HL3H-UTFX]; Dave 
Simpson, Allergan, Tribe Want PTAB Immunity Denial Reheard En Banc, LAW360 (Aug. 
20, 2018, 9:59 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1075198/allergan-tribe-want-ptab-im 
munity-denial-reheard-en-banc [https://perma.cc/3F3L-5ZV3]. 
337  Simpson, supra note 336; see also Bultman, supra note 336. 
338  Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1292. 
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the assignment was a “sham.”339 Now, Allergan and the Mohawk tribe are ask-
ing the Federal Circuit to reconsider its decision en banc.340 The Federal Cir-
cuit’s decision is correct in that sovereign immunity is not implicated where the 
federal government is acting through an agency. Nonetheless the decision un-
fortunately leaves us with unanswered questions. The contours of tribal immun-
ity remain murky. 
The agreement between Allergan and Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe directly 
affects the United States. This immunity agreement violated many individuals’ 
rights. If the PTAB had granted the tribe’s motion and upheld sovereign im-
munity, authors and inventors would be left to cover their losses. A blanket as-
sertion of sovereign immunity deprives individuals of their right to seek relief 
for actionable wrongs. In the patent context, Authors and Inventors lose their 
right to seek a remedy and lose the incentive to continue to create beneficial 
works for society. If the assertion of immunity protected these patents, it is 
likely that more deals of this nature would become another enterprise for tribes. 
But at what cost is the United States protecting a sovereign? A blanket asser-
tion of tribal immunity creates a gap between law and remedy. 
Sovereign immunity is rationalized as a benefit to society, however, recent 
application of tribal immunity demonstrates that it is in fact hindering our soci-
ety. Congress is conferred with the power to promote the progress of science by 
granting authors and inventors exclusive rights.341 Congress also has the power 
to abrogate tribal immunity, although it has only done so in rare instances.342 In 
such a case, Congress is failing to fulfill its duties—Congress fails to promote 
the progress of science and fails to abrogate tribal immunity when society is no 
longer benefiting. 
Despite that Congress has limited the immunity that states, the federal gov-
ernment, and foreign nations enjoy, it has failed to do the same for tribal im-
munity. The bill Senator McCaskill has introduced is an optimistic start. It in-
tends to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings.343 However, 
the bill is lacking greatly. When Allergan’s deal with the Mohawk tribe became 
public, it was clear that their clever scheme, the use of tribal immunity to pro-
tect business interests, is not constrained to patents, pharmaceutical companies, 
or IPR proceedings. The bill is limited to one proceeding and does not ade-
                                                        
339  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1326. 
340  Simpson, supra note 336. Seven states and two universities are also urging the Federal 
Circuit to reconsider its ruling en banc because the states and universities are afraid that the 
same analysis could be applied to state sovereign immunity. Ryan Davis, States Back Tribe, 
Allergan Fed. Circ. Bid for PTAB Immunity, LAW360 (Sept. 7, 2018, 7:51 PM), https://www. 
law360.com/articles/1080924/states-back-tribe-allergan-fed-circ-bid-for-ptab-immunity [http 
s://perma.cc/2XFP-NP4B]. 
341  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
342  See supra Section III.B. 
343  S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017). The PTAB denied the assertion of tribal immunity in Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1329. Still, the consideration of the bill is warranted. 
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quately address the exploitation of sovereign immunity in other proceedings.344 
It also does not limit the use of tribal sovereign immunity in other commercial 
transactions. Shortly after Allergan announced its transfer to the Mohawk tribe, 
democratic senators urged a Senate committee to investigate the licensing 
deal.345 The senators expressed their concern—“[c]ompanies should not be al-
lowed to pay states and tribes simply to invoke their sovereign immunity, and 
companies like Allergan should not be allowed to exploit sovereign immunity 
at the expense of patients.”346 Essentially, businesses—either to protect their 
patents or other business interests—are not prevented from “buying” immunity. 
Therefore, I propose that Congress enact law to abrogate the sovereign 
immunity that tribes enjoy. Specifically, if Congress relies on the same prece-
dent that has developed state, federal, and foreign sovereign immunity, logical-
ly it follows that tribal immunity should also differentiate between the proprie-
tary, commercial acts, and governmental acts, and draw distinctions between 
actions on and off Indian reservations. Tribal immunity is based on the same 
underlying principles and it is completely absurd that no limitations have been 
placed on the scope of tribal immunity. 
The clever immunity purchase is a wake-up call for Congress, exposing 
that tribal immunity is close to absolute. In Lewis, the Supreme Court made a 
distinction between the acts of tribes and the acts of tribal employees, which 
will influence future decisions.347 The distinction between commercial and 
governmental activities will significantly impact the scope of tribal immunity. 
Congress should impose the same limits that it imposes on states, the federal 
government, and foreign nations. Indeed, the Federal Circuit recognized “there 
are many parallels” between tribal immunity and state sovereign immunity.348 
Recent decisions reveal that courts have become increasingly uncomfortable 
with the scope of tribal immunity.349 In fact, courts have acknowledged in tribal 
immunity cases that had the defendant “been a state or municipal government, 
the Federal Government, or a foreign nation, it would have been amenable to 
suit in either state or federal courts.”350 Still, Congress must unequivocally ex-
press its intent to abrogate tribal immunity. 
Accordingly, Congress must take action and expressly abrogate the sover-
eign immunity of tribes when they engage in commercial activities or when 
they are engaged in activities off-reservation. Only those acts necessary for the 
sovereign to govern itself should be protected. Congress must correct the gap 
                                                        
344  S. 1948. 
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346  Id. 
347  Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1292 (2017). 
348  Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 896 F.3d at 1329. 
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between law and remedy that it has allowed to develop because “[t]he very es-
sence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim 
the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”351 
                                                        
351  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
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